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Abstract— the aim of this paper is to provide a quantitative 
estimate of the indirect financial distress costs. This paper 
focuses on the Malaysian trading and services sector and 
concentrates only on measuring the financial distress costs in 
terms of changes in operating performance and changes in 
capital values. This study will contribute to the existing literature 
by providing an alternative proxy for indirect financial distress 
costs and perhaps of the first paper to provide the quantitative 
estimate of the costs for Malaysia’s financially distressed firms. 
Findings from our study suggest that indirect costs exist, and are 
found to be between 3.1% to 21.39%.  It also suggests those three 
variables; Tobin’s q, size and expected earnings growth are 
statistically significant at 0.01, 0.1 and 0.05 significance level. 
 




    Indirect costs of financial distress, which is considered as 
opportunity costs [1], refer to the costs suffered by a firm as a 
consequence of its weakening financial position [2] or a 
disruption of “business as usual” [3, 4]. These costs may be 
viewed in two ways: (a) changes in the operational 
performance [2, 5-10], and (b) changes in the value of the 
companies [11-14]. 
Even though the theoretical debate about financial distress 
costs is entrenched in the study of capital structure [15], the 
potential contribution of the study goes beyond capital 
structure literature. Financial distress costs were found to be a 
relevant factor for many financing decisions [16], such as in 
determining the optimal capital structure [17], demand for 
conventional and Islamic insurance [18], corporate hedging 
practices [19, 20], and trade receivables policy [21]. This is 
further supported by the recent study conducted by [22]. Their 
study found that 88% of Malaysian managers indicate that the 
potential costs of bankruptcy or financial, is strongly 
influencing their decision in determining the appropriate 
amount of corporate debt for their firms.  In addition, current 
literature related to the influencing factors affecting financial 
distress costs is very scattered. Several studies (see for 
example [13, 23-25]), have examined the variation in firms’ 
financial distress costs to determine which of the variables are 
significant in influencing the magnitude of financial distress 
costs.  
    Despite the above mentioned importance of this topic, there 
are relatively few studies measuring the size and analysing the 
determinants of indirect costs [26, 27]. One of the possible 
reasons for the lack of research on the indirect financial 
distress cost is due to its opportunity costs nature and the 
difficulty in specifying and empirically measuring such costs 
[3, 6, 23].  
    To the best of our knowledge, there was no study conducted 
for Malaysia’s financially distressed companies, which, 
contributing to the non-existence of financial distress cost data 
for Malaysia [28]. Several authors have used other variables 
as a proxy for indirect financial distress costs. The examples 
are [18, 29], those who use working capital to total assets ratio, 
long term debt ratio and interest coverage ratio, and [30] uses 
liquidity (ratio of quick assets to total current assets) as the 
proxy for the indirect financial distress costs. Our study is 
therefore, aiming to fill this gap. 
  In this paper, we argue that the size and determinants of 
financial distress costs would be different due to its unique 
firm specific characteristics. The study of the magnitude and 
determinants of financial distress costs that is specific to 
Malaysia’s legal and listing requirement is very important 
because the existence and significance of the financial distress 
costs depend on the market setting [1], hence, empirical 
findings from other countries cannot be generalized to 
Malaysia. Furthermore, the robustness of the findings of the 
previous studies needs to be examined against the evidences 
from other countries such as Malaysia. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Past Studies on Indirect Financial Distress Costs 
 Altman [5] was the first paper who highlights the need for 
estimating the indirect costs of financial distress [31]. In his 
research, bankruptcy costs are measured in two ways; (a) as 
profit losses (the difference between foregone sales and 
actual earnings), and (b) abnormal losses (resulting from the 
difference between estimated and actual earnings). His 
findings suggest that, on average, the indirect costs of 
financial distress equal 10.5% and up to 20.8% (abnormal 
losses) of the company’s value. Even though Altman [5] is 
considered the pioneer in this area, there are several 
limitations in this research, as highlighted by  [32]. First, as 
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the sample is small, the results should not be considered as 
conclusive. Second, as pointed by [33] himself, the indirect 
costs should not just be limited to companies, which actually 
fails, firms with high probabilities of failure, whether they 
eventually fail or not, still incur costs.  
    In the same year, reference [34] provides a theoretical 
argument that firm’s liquidation decision imposes costs on 
nonfinancial stakeholders of the company. For example, 
customers of a company that manufacture a unique product 
may have to bear the increased costs of maintenance, 
employees may have to require new skills at a cost, and 
suppliers may have to incur expenses to adapt their facilities 
to manufacture other products if the company goes out of 
business. In response, customers will pay less for the products, 
labor will demand higher compensation, and suppliers will 
charge more for supplies if a company has a higher probability 
of being liquidated. Ultimately, companies will bear these 
expected liquidation costs along with the costs of conflicting 
interests of bondholders and stockholders. 
    Another important early study on this topic is done by 
Cutler and Summers [12]. They exploit a lawsuit between 
Texaco and Penzoil to separate these costs and conclude that 
the ex-ante costs of financial distress are around 9% of 
Texaco’s value. They argue that the significant part of the 
wealth loss can be attributed to the effect of the lengthy 
dispute on Texaco’s long-term viability, making it difficult for 
the company to obtain credit, and distracting Texaco’s 
management from their duties. However, similar to [5], the 
sample used in this research is too specialized and small; 
hence, the findings cannot be easily generalized. 
    Following [5, 12, 34], several other studies have attempted 
to quantify the magnitude of the indirect financial distress 
costs, each using quite distinct methodologies and data sets.   
These include the work by [10, 14, 23, 26, 35-46]. 
    However, despite decades of research, there is no common 
consensus on the scale of the indirect financial distress costs. 
The review of the available theoretical and empirical evidence 
suggests that there are both costs and benefits associated with 
financial distress [14]. This lack of agreement is largely driven 
by the very heterogeneous techniques used to identify and 
quantify the financial distress costs [10].  
    Therefore, this paper attempts to provide more insights into 
the understanding of this topic by investigating and presenting 
the empirical evidence on the magnitude of the indirect 




B. Determinants of Indirect financial distress costs 
1. Time in distress (TID) 
 Previous studies [e.g., See [47-49]] suggest that time in 
distress has a positive association with the costs of financial 
distress. The basic argument is that time in distress relates to 
the CFD because the claimants might expand the company’s 
resources over the time. The quicker the problems of a 
distressed firm are resolved; the value of the firm will be 
better. This is further supported by the research by Gertner & 
Scharfstein [50] and Giammarino [51], which suggests that 
bargaining and coordination problems may slow down the 
restructuring process, and hence resulting in a higher CFD. 
 However, Reference [52] argue that under well 
functioning market with a large number of  buyers, price-
takers and rational sellers and creditors, claimants’ bargains 
are nearly costless; therefore, the overall firm value is not 
affected. Reference [23] and [47] also found no significant 
effect of firm value or lost growth opportunities on the time in 
default. Hence, given the issues presented above, the 
following hypothesis will be tested: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant positive relationship 
between time in distress and indirect financial distress costs. 
 
 
2. Leverage (LEV) 
 Leverage continues to be one of the most important 
explanatory variables in explaining financial distress costs. 
There are, however, opposing arguments for either positive or 
negative relation between leverage and financial distress costs. 
Reference [53]  and [54] suggested that there is a positive 
relationship between leverage and financial distress costs. 
Reference  give evidence that there is a positive relationship 
between financial structure and firm performance in industry 
downturns. They reveal that more highly leveraged companies 
tend to lose market share and experience lower operating 
profits than their competitors in industry downturns. This 
indirectly suggests a positive relationship between leverage 
and loss of market shares since one measurement of financial 
distress costs is by calculating the changes in corporate 
performance. Reference [48] and [56] offer a different 
perspective of the problem in which not only the costs, but 
also the potential benefits of debt for financial distress 
processes are considered, implying that the benefits of 
leverage will reduce financial distress costs. Thus, this paper 
argues that there is an ambiguous relationship between 
leverage and indirect financial distress costs.  
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant positive/negative 
relationship between leverage and indirect financial distress 
costs. 
 
3. Change in Investment Policy (CINV) 
 As financial distress turns more serious and the probability 
of bankruptcy rises, the way in which firms react to the crisis 
must also be taken into consideration [57]. The eventual 
recovery or bankruptcy of the firm will be the results of the 
firm’s reaction and the financial distress costs it bears [24]. In 
this context, this paper has selected the changes in investment 
policies as responses to financial distress, which will have an 
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impact on the current performance of the firm. Reference [55, 
58] recognize that firms investment policy is affected during a 
financial crises. 
 Reference [26] shows that there is a negative relationship 
between change in investment policy and the size of indirect 
financial distress costs. This means that the divesture 
increases the costs of financial distress. Hence, this paper 
posits the third hypothesis as: Change in investment policy is 
negatively related to the indirect financial distress costs.  
Hypothesis 3: There is a significant negative relationship 
between change in investment policy and indirect financial 
distress costs.  
 
4. Tobin’s Q (TQ) 
 In this study, investment opportunities are proxied by 
Tobin’s Q. Significance of the Tobin’s Q coefficient would 
support the need to control for investment opportunities when 
explaining financial distress costs. The idea is that if a firm 
has good investment opportunities in comparison to its sector, 
this could mitigate the financial distress costs borne by the 
firm.  Reference [7] found a strong positive relationship 
between Tobin’s Q and all proxies for a firm’s growth, and 
[59] show that Tobin’s Q is better suited than book-to-market 
ratio to proxy for investment opportunities. These leading this 
paper to anticipate that a firm’s investment opportunity will 
influence its expected sales growth. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a significant negative relationship 
between TQ and indirect financial distress costs 
 
5. Intangible Assets (INTANG) 
 Firms with high asset intangibility usually have values in 
trademark, expertise, patents, rights, brand names, good 
reputations and services after sales. In addition to that, the 
products of these firms will usually be priced relatively higher. 
That is, customers have to pay higher prices for products or 
services provided by high asset intangible firms. However, 
when high intangible asset companies experience severe 
financial distress, their customers will have higher loss since 
they lose not only the promised after-sale-service, but also the 
product name, reputation and status, for which the customers 
have already paid when they bought the products. As a result 
of financial distress, customers of high asset intangibility will 
become more hesitant to buy its products. Therefore, it is 
common to believe that when a firm is in financial distress, 
the more intangible the firm’s assets, the higher the sales loss.  
Following the above discussion, the following hypothesis will 
be tested: 
Hypothesis 5: There is a significant positive relationship 
between intangible assets and indirect financial distress costs. 
6. Tangible Assets (TANG) 
 Financial contracts are strongly influenced by the degree 
to which a company’s assets support the transactions with 
some form of collateral normally being essential to gaining 
access to credit. Thus, the proportion of tangible fixed assets 
in total company assets is a measure of the capacity to provide 
collateral and consequently obtain (re) financing. Nevertheless, 
these assets suffer a big loss of value when small companies 
go into distress because they will often negotiate in adverse 
market conditions. Reference [46] point out that in recessions 
many potential buyers of a company’s assets only buy when 
there is a big discount. Thus, sellers of a distressed company 
try to postpone transactions until the markets become more 
liquid. Therefore, the higher the percentage of tangibles fixed 
assets over the total assets; the incentive will be smaller for 
the different stakeholders to push the firm into bankruptcy. As 
a result, this research posits the sixth hypothesis as: 
Hypothesis 6: There is a significant negative relationship 
between tangible assets and indirect financial distress costs.  
7. Holding of Liquid Assets (LA) 
 The cash component of the assets is utilized by the firm to 
assist them in mitigating the effect of financial distress. 
Pindado & Rodrigues [24] find that the holding of liquid 
assets are negatively related to the costs of financial distress 
which implies that insolvent firms can take advantage of 
holding larger stocks of this kind of assets. Hence, this paper 
posits the seventh hypothesis as:  
Hypothesis 7: There is a significant positive relationship 
between liquid assets and indirect financial distress costs. 
8. Expected earnings growths (EEG) 
 Firms with higher expected earnings growth are 
considered susceptible to greater losses in distress [60]. This is 
because a significant of their operational value depends on 
unrealized high future earnings [61]. In times of distress, these 
relatively large components of value are lost. In addition, 
consistent with debt overhang problem, industries with large 
growth opportunities tend to have high potential costs of 
financial distress. 
Hypothesis 8: There is a significant positive relationship 
between expected earnings growth and indirect financial 
distress costs. 
9. Size (SIZE) 
 In theory, small firms have a bigger problem in assessing 
capital because of the asymmetric information between 
insiders and outsiders. The difficulties become severe when 
the possibility of liquidation arises. However, managing large 
firms during the period of financial distress maybe costly 
since its more complicated internal organizations require 
implicit contracts which may be difficult to enforce during 
difficult times [62]. Bigger size may represent higher level 
and more complex conflicts of interest, making it more 
difficult for the claimants to agree over resolving the distress. 
Moreover, bigger firms may positively relate to a larger 
number of creditors and bigger bank loans received by 
distressed firms. Given the possibility of higher conflicts in 
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distress resolution as the number of creditors increases, the 
following hypothesis is tested: 
Hypothesis 9: There is a significant positive relationship 
between size and the indirect financial distress costs. 
In summary, the predicted sign of the coefficients in the 
regression model in equation (1) is positive for β1, β5, β8, β9, 




A. Population, Sample and Data Collection Procedures 
    The target population for the research was all companies 
from the trading and services sector listed as financially 
distressed by Bursa Malaysia under the requirement of PN4, 
PN17 and Amended PN17 respectively, from 15 February 
2001 when PN4 was introduced, until 31 December 2011. As 
of 31 December 2011, there are 48 companies listed as 
affected issuers under the requirement of PN4, PN17 and 
Amended PN17.  
In order to highlight the trends of the CFD, following 
Bisogno & De Luca [10], the estimation period is designated 
as five years prior to the event period. The years relative to the 
financial distress date are defined as years t-5, t-4 t-3, t-2, and 
t-1,  where t-5 represents five years before the firm is 
classified as financially distressed firm, while t-4,  t-3, t-2, t-1 
represent 4, 3, 2 and 1 year before the classification date. 
 
B. Measurement of indirect financial distress costs 
     The literature provides two ways of measuring the indirect 
financial distress costs, which is by looking at the changes in 
operating performance or changes in the value of the 
companies [9, 11, 12]. This paper quantifies the indirect 
financial distress cost in terms of both, changes in operating 
performance (opportunity costs, industry-adjusted 
EBITDA/sales and industry-adjusted EBITDA/assets) and 
changes in capital values (capital discount sales assets).  
     The first measure of operating performance is expressed in 
terms of opportunity costs [24, 26, 40]. It is calculated as the 
difference between the firm’s sales growth and sector’s sales 
growth. A positive answer will demonstrate that the firm bear 
an opportunity cost and underperform compared to its sector.              
    As for the second and third measure of operating 
performance, this paper follows [14], and measure  the 
changes in operating performance relative to the sector by 
calculating the industry-adjusted EBITDA to sales (and 
assets).  
    Changes in equity values are estimated in terms of capital 
discount. The value of the companies is calculated as the 
difference between the firm’s estimated value and actual value. 
The following Table 1 below presents the methods for 
calculating the indirect financial distress costs. 
 
TABLE 1 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND CALCULATION 
Variable Description and calculation 
Opportunity 




[(Salesit/Salesit-1)*100]Sector = Sector's 
sales growth 







E/Sf – E/SI 
Where: 
E/Sf  = EBITDA / Sales for firm f 







E/Af – E/AI 
Where: 
E/Af  = EBITDA / Assets for firm f 
















C. Definition and definition of variables 
Reference [33] suggests that measures of indirect costs 
must be based on the foregone sales and profits. He also 
establishes a strong correlation between a firm’s sales 
performance and industry sales in any given year. 
Therefore, in this study, following [32, 33, 63, 64], indirect 
cost estimate is expressed in terms of opportunity costs [24, 
26, 40]. It is calculated as the difference between the 
firm’s sales growth and sector’s sales growth. A positive 
answer will show that the firm bears an opportunity cost 
and underperforms compared to its sector. All the 
variables are shown in Table 2: 
 
Table 2: 





CFD  = [(Salesit – Sales it-1) / Salesit]sector    –      
[(Salesit – Sales it-1) / Salesit ]firm 
TID  Time period (year) each company was in financial 
distress   








































Market Value of Assets
 X100 
SIZE = lnSales 
 
D. Research model and estimation procedures 
 
 This study employs the econometric analysis using 
panel data that combines the features of time-series and cross-
sectional data.  In line with the objectives of this study, this 
study uses three main estimations – Pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS), Fixed Effect (FE) and Random Effect (RE). 
Previous researcher such as Pareja and Linero (2006) uses 
both OLS and FE in their study, while Ameer (2010) used 
Pooled OLS only. The main objective of this paper is to 
examine the determinants of indirect financial distress costs. 
This paper specifies and estimates the following regression 
model for all firms: 
CFDit = β0 + β1TIDit + β2LEVit + β3CINVit + β4TQit + 
β5INTANGit + β6TANGit + β7LAit + β8EEGit + β9SIZEit + εit           
(1)          
Where: 
  CFDit  = Indirect financial distress costs 
  β1TIDit  = Time period in distress 
  β2LEVit   = Leverage 
  β3CINVit = Change in investment policy 
  β4TQit  = Tobin’s Q 
  β5INTANGit = Intangible assets 
  β6TANGit = Tangible assets 
  β7LAit  = Liquid Assets 
  β8EEGit  = Expected earnings growth 
  β9SIZEi  = Size of the firms’ sales 
  εit    = Error term 
 
With the above multivariate regression specification, the 
impact of each of the explanatory variables on the  indirect 
financial distress costs was assessed in terms of the statistical 
significance of the coefficients “βit”. An estimated coefficient 
considered as statistically significant if the p-value ≤ 0.1, p-
value ≤ 0.05 and p-value ≤ 0.01 respectively (significant 
at .1, .05 and .01 significance level). 
In this paper, the choice of an appropriate model among 
pooled OLS or FE or RE depends upon three types of test as 
suggested and outlined by Park [65]. The tests are F-test, 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, and Hausman 
test. This paper will report if fixed and/or random effect exists 
because panel data modelling is to examine fixed and/or 
random effects [65]. This paper will report and interpret the 
results of the F-test for a fixed model, Breusch-Pagan LM test 
for a random effect model. When both fixed and random 
effects are statistically significant, this paper will conduct a 
Hausman test and report the results. Table 3 below 
summarizes the decision rule used for selecting the most 
appropriate model to explain the variation in the magnitude of 
the indirect financial distress costs. 
 
 
Table 3: Decision rule of the panel specification tests 




(B-P LM test) 
Model Selection 









H0 is rejected 
(fixed 
effects) 

















H0 is rejected 
(random 
effects) 
Choose a FE model if the 
null hypothesis of a 
Hausman test is rejected; 
otherwise fit a RE model. 
              Source: Adopted from Park [65]. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
A. Estimation of indirect financial distress costs 
 
The main objective of this study was to provide empirical 
evidence on the size of the indirect financial distress costs to 
the firms under investigations. This section considers the 
quantitative estimate of the costs of financial distress in terms 
of changes in operating performance and changes in capital 
values 
1. Operating Performance:  
Table 4 shows the values of the indirect costs that were 
estimated in terms of changes in operating performance. Three 
measures that were used to estimate the costs were the 
opportunity costs (panel A), industry-adjusted EBITDA over 
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sales (Panel B), and industry-adjusted EBITDA over total 
assets (Panel C).    
     The sales growth rate which was measured as the 
difference between the sales growth of the sector and the 
firm’s sales growth, indicates that the size of the costs for the 
whole period of study is about 10.21% (SD=66.01). As 
expected, the size of this cost increased from only -1.50% (T-
5) to 24.91% (T-1) as it comes closer to financial distress. 
These results are comparable to [26] and [40], who found that 
the financially distressed firm bear mean 12% sales loses with 
respect to the industry. Therefore, it is likely the impact of 
annual increase in the indirect costs contributes to the firm’s 
eventual classification as affected issuers.   
     As opposed to CFD based on opportunity costs, Panel B 
and C (Table 3), offers a different perspective.   For the whole 
period of study, both IAES and IAEA shows that the firms are 
performing better than the industry. For the whole study 
period, the mean for industry-adjusted EBITDA/sales and 
industry-adjusted EBITDA/ Assets is -3.1 (SD=120.83) and -
10.66 (SD=21.80) respectively.  
 
 TABLE 4 
INDIRECT FINANCIAL DISTRESS COSTS (OPERATING 
PERFORMANCE) 
  T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-5 to T-1 
Panel A (Opportunity Costs) 
Mean 24.91 1.86 16.29 -4.82 -1.5 10.21 
Median 26.65 20.07 19.74 13.7 5.59 15.34 
SD 34.94 80.63 41.7 114.01 52.76 66.01 
Panel B (industry-adjusted EBITDA/Sales) 
Mean -81.36 -23.07 -35.9 -18.37 -7.25 -3.1 
Median -15.36 -11.46 -14.25 12.29 -3.77 -7.3 
SD 244.73 52.32 78.43 35.56 39.39 120.83 
Panel C (industry-adjusted EBITDA/Total Assets) 
Mean -15.36 -11.07 -13.14 -8.91 -4.81 -10.66 
Median -9.19 -7 -8.86 -7.8 3.57 -15.27 
SD 25.73 15.32 19.85 9.91 8.02 21.80 
 
 
2. Capital Values:  
As described earlier, capital value losses for the sample 
firms are calculated using the actual market value (defined as 
the market value plus the book value of debt), and estimated 
value using the [66] multiplier approach for sales and assets. 
A positive answer for changes in capital values will 
demonstrate that firm a trading at a discount and shows that 
the sample firms experience losses in capital value. Table 5 
presents the actual value, estimated capital values (sales), 
estimated capital values (total assets), capital discount (sales) 
and capital discount (total assets) for the sample firms during 
the study period. 
     As shown in Panel A and B, the mean of the actual and 
estimated values is much larger than the median capital values, 
indicating the capital values are skewed. Declines in the actual 
and estimated values are observed as the sample firms near 
financial distress. For example, the estimated capital value 
(sales) during the T-5 is 259.88 million (SD=217.08), and 
drop to 182.53 million (SD=175.14) in T-1. Similar patterns 
can be observed for actual value (Panel C). For the whole 
period of the study (T-5 to T-1), the mean for actual value is 
383.65 million (SD=499.71), and recorded a drop by almost 
100%, between T-5 (mean = 524.65 million) and T-1 (mean = 
262.49 million). The decrease in the estimated values (sales 
and total assets) and actual value is expected because the 
operating performance of the sample firms deteriorates as it 
nears financial distress.  
     Panel D and E provides the capital discount based on the 
[66] estimates. The discounts in capital values are estimated as 
estimated market values minus actual values divided by 
estimated market values. As opposed to the above, where the 
capital values (sales and assets) and actual values moving in 
the same direction (declining), the capital discounts offers a 
different perspective. From capital discount (sales) point of 
view, except for T-1, the sample firms seems to be trading at a 
premium, and perform better than the sector. This is consistent 
with the statement by [56] that, “financial distress often 
accompanied by comprehensive organizational changes in 
management, governance, and structure. This organizational 
restructuring can create value by improving the use of 
resources” (see [56] p.420). 
     The capital discount (assets), on the other hand shows that 
the sample firms experience losses in capital’s value. By the 
end of fiscal years prior to financial distress, the sample firms 
are trading at a discount about 40.73%. One of the possible 
explanations for this is assets fire sales [38, 46], where the 
firms, especially those experiencing financial distress, are 

















B. Regression results and analysis 
 
Table 6 presents the result of the Pearson’s Correlation 
coefficients among the independent variables. The correlation 
coefficients between pairs of independent variables are 
generally low, suggesting that a serious collinearity problem is 
unlikely. However, the statistically significant correlations 
between some of the independent variables reported in Table 3 
raise the possibility of multicollinearity. Therefore, variance 
inflation factors (VIF) is also computed to test for the 
presence of multicollinearity. Kennedy (1998) suggests that a 
VIF of more than 10 indicates harmful collinearity and may 
warrant further examination. While, Tolerance’s (defined as 
1/VIF) value that is lower than 0.1 is comparable to a VIF of 
10.  As shown in Table 7, the calculated VIF and 1/VIF are all 
less than 10 and more than 0.1 respectively, suggesting that 
multicollinearity does not appear to be a severe problem in 




Table 6: Correlation Matrix  
IV TID LEV CINV TQ 
TID 1.00    
LEV 0.03 1.00   
CINV 0.023 0.37* 1.00  
TQ -0.07 0.26* 0.15* 1.00  
                *significant at 5% level 
 
 INTANG TANG LA EEG SIZE 
INTANG 1.00      
TANG -0.26* 1.00     
LA -0.003  0.03 1.00    
EEG -0.03 0.07 0.03 1.00   
SIZE 0.33* -0.01 0.08 -0.03 1.00 
          *significant at 5% level 
Table 7: Variance-Inflation Factors  
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
SIZE 1.56 0.642564 
CINV 1.54 0.647709 
INTANG 1.42 0.705990 
LEV 1.33 0.753845 
TANG 1.15 0.867976 
TID 1.12 0.894776 
EEG 1.05 0.951586 
LA 1.02 0.975733 
Mean VIF 1.27  
 
 
    Table 9 presents the regression results from three different 
specifications of the basic model in equation (1). The results 
are based on Pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects 
regression. In this paper, the choice of an appropriate model 
among pooled OLS or fixed effects or random effects model 
depends upon three types of tests as suggested by [65]. The 
tests are Chow test, Breusch-Pagan LM test and Hausman 
Test. 
 
    Table 8 shows the results of the Chow test for a pooled 
model, the Breusch-Pagan LM test and the Hausman test. The 
results of the Chow test for a pooled model vs. the fixed-
effects model, F=2.05, as being significant at 1% level, 
suggest that a heterogenous fixed effect is superior to the 
pooled model.  
 
The next step is to estimate whether the random effects is 
preferred to pooled OLS estimation. As table 8 shows, the 
null hypothesis for the Breusch-Pagan LM test can be 
rejected and hence, it can be documented that the random 
effect model is the most efficient estimator. Meanwhile, the 
Hausman test for fixed effects vs. random effects model, χ2 
=28.19, is significant at 5% significance level, indicating that 
the difference between the random effects and fixed effect 
model is significant, leading to a conclusion that fixed effect 
model is better than a random effect model. Therefore, the 
  T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 Sector 
Panel A: Estimated capital value (Sales) 
Mean 182.53 209.56 221.13 265.14 259.88 1331.29 
Median 158.93 177.95 158.5 184.41 188.37 226.86 
SD 175.14 164.22 399.98 274.75 253.79 3918.6 
Panel B: Estimated capital value (Assets) 
Mean 325.85 358.95 389.08 477.08 560.38 1937.72 
Median 185.69 216.91 203.17 219.43 180.87 241.68 
SD 355.11 381.69 416.04 561.22 726.2 5995.58 
Panel C: Actual Value 
Mean 262.49 314.56 355.43 461.11 524.65 1898.81 
Median 81.12 172.15 158.5 205.74 186.25 223.03 
SD 348.73 384.82 399.98 573.4 681.35 5839 
Panel D: Capital Discount (Sales) 
Mean 100.91 -31.4 -63.18 -60.9 -60.4 4.07 
Median -3.78 -16.58 -30.5 -40.25 -37.54 0.05 
SD 77.05 119.11 137.49 115.3 123.93 86.01 
Panel E: Capital Discount (Assets) 
Mean 40.73 27.98 17.91 9.92 10.39 5.93 
Median 26.45 16.92 7.3 5.67 6.13 0.15 
SD 77.05 52.89 35.18 21.75 22.85 30.21 
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discussion of the determinants of indirect financial distress 
costs is based on the results of fixed effect model. 
 
TABLE 8 
PANELS SPECIFICATION TESTS 
Panel specification test 
Test Statistics value P value 
Chow test  2.05 0.0004 
Breush-Pagan LM test 3.44 0.0319 
Hausman test  28.19 0.0004 
 
 
     The result in Table 9 suggests that three variables were 
found to be statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
significance level. SIZE was found to be negatively related to 
indirect costs, suggesting that the bigger the firm’s assets, the 
smaller will be the indirect financial distress costs. This 
finding is consistent with  [3] that small firms might better be 
able to avoid problems of financial distress because of their 
less complicated internal contractual agreements. Reference [3] 
also shows that smaller firms experience drop in sales only 
slightly greater than the sample average while the experience 
drop in the market values of their equities, are considerably 
larger than the sample average.  For Tobin’s Q (TQ), 
consistent with previous literature such as [7], this paper 
found a strong positive relationship between TQ and CFD, 
leading this paper to anticipate that a firm’s investment 
opportunities will influence its expected sales growth.  As for 
the expected earnings growth (EEG), consistent with previous 
literature such as [60] and [61], this paper found a significant 
positive relationship between expected earnings growth (EEG) 
and CFD.  Firms with high expected earnings growth are 
considered prone to greater loses in distress [60]. This is 
because a significant of their operating value depends on as 
yet unrealized high future earnings [61]. In times of distress, 
these relatively large components of value are lost. In addition 
to that, consistent with debt overhang problem, industries with 
large growth opportunities tend to have high potential costs of 
financial distress.   
 
Table 9: Regression results 
TID 0.0025 (0.562) 
LEV -0.0284 (0.241) 
CINV 0.0229 (0.463) 
TQ 37.66* (0.021) 
INTANG 0.0148 (0.741) 
TANG 0.120 (0.709) 
LA 0.0129 (0.884) 
EEG 0.368** (0.002) 
SIZE -36.60*** (0.000) 
Constant 153.0*** (0.000) 
N 240 
R2 0.427 
Adj. R2 0.256 
p-values in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
C. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the indirect financial distress 
costs for 48 financially distressed firms from the trading and 
services sector. The mean indirect costs is 10.21% 
(SD=66.01), -3.1% (SD=120.83), -10.66% (SD=21.80), and 
4.07% (SD=86.01), 5.93% (SD=30.21) for opportunity costs, 
median-adjusted EBITDA/sales, median-adjusted 
EBITDA/assets, capital discount (sales), and capital discount 
(Assets) respectively. It is important to note that the capital 
discount (sales) shows that the firms under investigation are 
operating at a premium, and perform better than the sector. 
The evidence also provides further confirmation the pattern of 
the indirect costs. All proxies for indirect financial distress 
costs, with the exception IAES and IAEA, increases and 
become apparent as the firms near financial distress. The 
results also suggest that only three explanatory variables, 
Tobin’s Q, SIZE and expected earnings growth are 
statistically significant. Although this paper provides 
empirical evidence, a number of areas need to be refined with 
future empirical research. This study focuses only on trading 
and services sectors and concentrates only on the quantitative 
estimates of the costs. Future research might want to include 
other sectors and consider other techniques or models to 
estimate the costs. 
 
 
Acknowledgement: This paper is part of an ongoing Ph.D. 
(Finance) research project currently undertaken by the first 
author at the Arshad Ayub Graduate Business School, 
Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM) under supervision of 
Professor Dr. Norhana Salamudin (co-author).  
 
REFERENCES 
1. Warner, J.B., Bankruptcy costs: Some evidence. The Journal of 
Finance, 1977. 32(2): p. 337-347. 
2. Elali, W. and T. Trainor, Advanced Corporate Finance: A Practical 
Approach, First Edition. 2008: Pearson Education Canada. 
3. Opler, T.C., Controlling financial distress costs in leveraged 
buyouts with financial innovations. Financial Management, 1993. 
22(3): p. 79-90. 
4. Opler, T.C., Controlling Financial Distress Costs in Leveraged 
Buyouts with Financial Innovations. Financial Management, 1993. 
22: p. 79. 
5. Altman, E.I., A further empirical investigation of the bankruptcy 
cost question. Journal of Finance, 1984. 39(4): p. 1067-1089. 
6. Altman, E.I. and E. Hotchkiss, Corporate financial distress and 
bankruptcy: predict and avoid bankruptcy, analyze and invest in 
distressed debt. Vol. 289. 2006: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
7. Lang, L., A. Poulsen, and R. Stulz, Asset sales, firm performance, 
and the agency costs of managerial discretion. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 1995. 37(1): p. 3-37. 
8. Sanz, L.J. and J. Ayca, Financial distress costs in Latin America: 
A case study. Journal of Business Research, 2006. 59(3): p. 394-
395. 
9. Scherr, F.C., Some Evidence on Asset Liquidation Losses: The 
Case of WT Grant. Nebraska Journal of Economics and Business, 
1983: p. 3-23. 
10. Bisogno, M. and R. De Luca, Indirect Costs of Bankruptcy: 
Evidence from Italian SMEs. Journal of Accounting and Finance, 
2012. 2(1): p. 20-30. 
11. Branch, B., The costs of bankruptcy: A review. International 
Review of Financial Analysis, 2002. 11(1): p. 39-57. 
GSTF Journal on Business Review (GBR) Vol.3 No.4, November 2014
© 2014 GSTF
15
12. Cutler, D.M. and L.H. Summers, The costs of conflict resolution 
and financial distress: Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil 
litigation. 1989, National Bureau of Economic Research 
Cambridge, Mass., USA. 
13. Wijantini, The indirect costs of financial distress in Indonesia. 
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business, 2007. 41(4): p. 
307-305. 
14. Singhal, R., Indirect Bankruptcy Costs, in David Eccles School of 
Business. 2003, David Eccles School of Business, University of 
Utah. 
15. Pindado, J., L. Rodrigues, and C. De La Torre, Estimating 
financial distress likelihood. Journal of Business Research, 2008. 
61(9): p. 995-1003. 
16. Singhal, R. and Y.E. Zhu, Bankruptcy risk, costs and corporate 
diversification. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2013. 37: p. 1475-
1489. 
17. Ahmed, H.J.A. and N. Hisham, Revisiting Capital Structure 
Theory: A Test of Pecking Order and Static Order Trade-off 
Model from Malaysian Capital Market. International Research 
Journal of Finance and Economics, 2009. 30. 
18. Hamid, M.A., et al., Determinants of Corporate Demand for 
Islamic Insurance in Malaysia. International Journal of Economics 
and Management, 2009. 3(2): p. 278-296. 
19. Ertugrul, M., Ö. Sezer, and C. Sirmans, Financial leverage, CEO 
compensation, and corporate hedging: evidence from real estate 
investment trusts. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, 2008. 36(1): p. 53-80. 
20. Judge, A., The determinants of foreign currency hedging by UK 
non-financial firms. 2004, Working Paper, Middlesex University. 
21. Molina, C.A. and L.A. Preve, Trade receivables policy of 
distressed firms and its effect on the costs of financial distress. 
Financial Management, 2009. 38(3): p. 663-686. 
22. Nor, F.M., et al., Practices of Capital Structure Decisions: 
Malaysia Survey Evidence. International Review of Business 
Research Papers, 2012. 8(1): p. 33-63. 
23. Andrade, G. and S.N. Kaplan, How costly is financial (not 
economic) distress? Evidence from highly leveraged transactions 
that became distressed. Journal of Finance, 1998. 53(5): p. 1443-
1493. 
24. Pindado, J. and L. Rodrigues, Determinants of Financial Distress 
Costs. Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, 2005. 19(4): 
p. 343-359. 
25. Zhang, P. and S. Gan. Financial distress costs and ownership 
structure in listed companies. 2010. Wuhan. 
26. Tshitangano, F., Cost of financial distress model for JSE listed 
companies: A Case of South Africa, in Gordon Institute of 
Business Science. 2010, University of Pretoria. 
27. White, M.J., Bankruptcy costs and the new bankruptcy code. 
Journal of Finance, 1983. 38(2): p. 477-488. 
28. Chin, N.S., Prediction Of Corporate Failure: A Study Of The 
Malaysian Corporate Sector. 2005, Multimedia University. 
29. Hamid, M.A., Financial Expositions of Corporate Determinants for 
Conventional Insurance: Evidence from Malaysian Firms. 
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 
2010(43): p. 80-93. 
30. Ameer, R., Determinants of Corporate Hedging Practices in 
Malaysia. International Business Research, 2010. 3(2): p. P120-
P120. 
31. Outecheva, N., Corporate Financial Distress: An Empirical 
Analysis of Distress Risk. 2007, University of St. Gallen. 
32. Chen, G., An empirical examination of the indirect costs of 
financial distress. 1995, University of Texas: Dallas. p. 134. 
33. Altman, E.I., A further empirical investigation of the bankruptcy 
cost question. The Journal of Finance, 1984. 39(4): p. 1067-1089. 
34. Titman, S., The effect of capital structure on a firm's liquidation 
decision. Journal of Financial Economics, 1984. 13(1): p. 137-151. 
35. Almeida, H. and T. Philippon, The Risk-Adjusted Cost of 
Financial Distress. The Journal of Finance, 2007. 62(6): p. 2557-
2586. 
36. Bris, A., I. Welch, and N. Zhu, The costs of bankruptcy: Chapter 7 
liquidation versus Chapter 11 reorganization. The Journal of 
Finance, 2006. 61(3): p. 1253-1303. 
37. Carapeto, M., Is bargaining in Chapter 11 costly. 2000, 
(unpublished manuscript, Cass Business School, London). 
38. Denis, D.J. and D.K. Denis, Performance changes following top 
management dismissals. Journal of Finance, 1995: p. 1029-1057. 
39. Eberhart, A.C., W.T. Moore, and R.L. Roenfeldt, Security pricing 
and deviations from the absolute priority rule in bankruptcy 
proceedings. The Journal of Finance, 1990. 45(5): p. 1457-1469. 
40. Farooq, U. and M.S. Nazir, An analysis of operating and financial 
distress in Pakistani firms. Elixir Finance, 2012. 44(2012): p. 
7133-7137. 
41. Gilson, S.C., K. John, and L.H.P. Lang, Troubled debt 
restructurings: An empirical study of private reorganization of 
firms in default. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990. 27(2): p. 
315-353. 
42. Pham, T. and D. Chow, Some Estimates of Direct and Indirect 
Bankruptcy Costs in Australia: September 1978–May 1983. 
Australian Journal of Management, 1989. 14(1): p. 75-75. 
43. Pulvino, T.C., Effects of bankruptcy court protection on asset sales. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 1999. 52(2): p. 151-186. 
44. Yen, G. and J.F. Li, Financial distress announcements, transaction 
mode change, and aggregate shareholder wealth: Empirical 
evidence from TAIEX-listed companies. Review of Pacific Basin 
Financial Markets and Policies, 2010. 13(1): p. 19-43. 
45. Yen, G. and E.C. Yen, Estimates of financial distress costs 
revisited: Evidence from TSE-Listed firms. Atlantic Economic 
Journal, 2008. 36(1): p. 121-122. 
46. Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny, Liquidation values and debt 
capacity: A market equilibrium approach. Journal of Finance, 1992. 
47(4): p. 1343-1366. 
47. Helwege, J. and N. Liang, Is there a pecking order? Evidence from 
a panel of IPO firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 1996. 40(3): 
p. 429-458. 
48. Jensen, M., Eclipse of the public corporation. Harvard Business 
Review (Sept.-Oct. 1989), revised 1997., 1989. 
49. Jensen, M.C., Corporate control and the politics of finance. Journal 
of Applied Corporate Finance, 1991. 4(2): p. 13-34. 
50. Gertner, R. and D.S. Scharfstein, A theory of workouts and the 
effects of reorganization law. 1991, National Bureau of Economic 
Research Cambridge, Mass., USA. 
51. Giammarino, R.M., The resolution of financial distress. Review of 
Financial Studies, 1989. 2(1): p. 25-25. 
52. Haugen, R.A. and L.W. Senbet, The insignificance of bankruptcy 
costs to the theory of optimal capital structure. Journal of Finance, 
1978. 33(2): p. 383-393. 
53. Modigliani, F. and M.H. Miller, The cost of capital, corporation 
finance and the theory of investment. The American Economic 
Review, 1958. 48(3): p. 261-297. 
54. Modigliani, F. and M.H. Miller, Corporate income taxes and the 
cost of capital: A correction. The American Economic Review, 
1963. 53(3): p. 433-443. 
55. Opler, T.C. and S. Titman, Financial distress and corporate 
performance. The Journal of Finance, 1994. 49(3): p. 1015-1040. 
56. Wruck, K.H., Financial distress, reorganization, and organizational 
efficiency. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990. 27(2): p. 419-
444. 
57. John, T.A., Accounting measures of corporate liquidity, leverage, 
and costs of financial distress. Financial Management, 1993. 22(3): 
p. 91-100. 
58. Asquith, P., R. Gertner, and D. Scharfstein, Anatomy of financial 
distress: An examination of junk-bond issuers. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 1994. 109(3): p. 625-658. 
59. Pindado, J., L. Rodrigues, and C. de la Torre, How do insolvency 
codes affect a firm's investment? International Review of Law and 
Economics, 2008. 28(4): p. 227-238. 
60. Titman, S. and R. Wessels, The determinants of capital structure 
choice. Journal of Finance, 1988: p. 1-19. 
61. Yuval Dan Bar-Or, An investigation of expected financial distress 
costs. Dissertations available from ProQuest, 2000: p. 
AAI9965440. 
62. Novaes, W. and L. Zingales, Capital structure choice when 
managers are in control: Entrenchment versus efficiency. 1995, 
National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA. 
GSTF Journal on Business Review (GBR) Vol.3 No.4, November 2014
© 2014 GSTF
16
63. Cays, S.E., A Study on the Measurement and Prediction of the 
Indirect Costs of Bankruptcy. WORKING PAPER SERIES-NEW 
YORK UNIVERSITY SALOMON CENTER S, 2001(17): p. 25-
38. 
64. Chen, G.M. and L.J. Merville, An Analysis of the Underreported 
Magnitude of the Total Indirect Costs of Financial Distress. 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 1999. 13(3): p. 
277-293. 
65. Park, H.M., Practical Guides to Panel Data Modeling: A Step-by-
step Analysis Using Stata. Tutorial working paper. 2011, Graduate 
School of International Relations, International University of 
Japan. 
66. Berger, P.G. and E. Ofek, Diversification's effect on firm value. 







Norhisam Bulot  is a PhD. Student from the Faulty of Business Management, 
Universiti Teknologi MARA, under the supervision of Professor Dr Norhana 
Salamudin. His PhD. Research examines the size and the determinants of 
indirect financial distress costs in Malaysia. Additionally, Norhisam is 




Norhana Salamudin has PhD (Finance) from Universiti Putra Malaysia 
(1998) and  MBA (Finance), American University, Washington D.C. (1983). 
She is currently a faculty member of Arshad Ayub Graduate Business School, 
Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM). Positions held include Director, 
Institute of Business Excellence (IBE) (2012-13) and Deputy Dean (Quality 
and Research), Faculty of Business Management (2003-06). She teaches 
corporate finance, financial models, strategic finance and investment.  
Norhana has published in the Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Capital Market 
Review, Journal of Intellectual Capital, Business Management Quarterly 
Review, etc. Her research interests include ownership structure, capital raising, 




Wan Mohd Yaseer has Master of Science (Finance) from Universiti Utara 
Malaysia (2008) and Bachelor of Business Administration with Honours 
(Finance), Universiti Teknologi MARA (2002). He is currently a faculty 
member of Faculty of Business Management (FBM), Universiti Teknologi 
MARA (UiTM). Positions held include Course Coordinator (UiTM Perlis) 
(2012-14) and Internship Coordinator (2010-11). He teaches corporate finance, 
financial management and investment analysis. His research interests include 
ownership structure, capital raising, financial distress and short term fund 
raising.  
 
GSTF Journal on Business Review (GBR) Vol.3 No.4, November 2014
© 2014 GSTF
17
